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A Review of Constitutional Theocracy by Ran
Hirschl
SADIA SAEED*
Ran Hirschl's Constitutional Theocracyl is a comprehensive and
sophisticated analysis of the relationship between religions,
constitutions, and courts across much of the contemporary world. The
book is based on extensive analyses of national debates and
jurisprudence on issues of the relationship between state and religion
and secular and religious law. The book draws on debates taking place
among legal scholars, political scientists, political sociologists, and social
philosophers and is uniquely poised to speak to multiple audiences. It
also draws more general conclusions about trajectories of sociojuridical
change in a world increasingly defined by the public resurgence of
religious identities and claims-making.
The work is distinctive in several ways. First, it conceptualizes a
new legal order--constitutional theocracy-that has emerged in the
wake of the global resurgence of religion. Hirschl defines constitutional
theocracies as characterized by simultaneous adherence to modern
constitutional principles, including the core distinction between political
and religious authority, and religious principles. 2 The latter aspect
entails constitutional sanctioning of a "state religion" and religious law
as a or the main source of legislation. Second, it examines the
relationship between state and religion implicit in constitutional
theocracies as part of a larger continuum of "state-and-religion
models."3 One end of this continuum is occupied by communist regimes
that have adopted active campaigns and policies to eradicate religion,
and the other end is occupied by countries like Egypt, Israel, and
Pakistan-some of the main exemplars of constitutional theocracy
discussed in the book-that perennially struggle with reconciling
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1. RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010).
2. See id. at 2-3.
3. Id. at 26.
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foundational democratic ideals with equally core religious national
identity issues. Between these two ideal types lie a host of countries in
which the relationship between state and religion is mediated more
moderately. Examples include the selective accommodation of religion
in certain areas of the law (India, Kenya) and respect for religious
difference through explicit adherence to ideals of multiculturalism and
diversity (Canada, South Africa).
By bringing a larger set of national cases into a comparative
framework, the book showcases the centrality of the religion question
for constitution makers and interpreters across different political,
cultural, and social settings. Such a focus leads Hirschl to make what in
my view is the book's central and most original argument-
constitutional theocracy allows modern states to contain the excesses of
religion in contexts where there is popular support for imposition of
religious law by delegating the state-and-religion issue to constitutional
courts that are peopled by secularly inclined judges. In the process,
these courts "have become bastions of relative secularism, pragmatism,
and moderation, thereby emerging as effective shields against the
spread of religiosity and garnering increased popular support for
principles of theocratic governance."4
First, Hirschl devotes a chapter to examining the multiple
rationales that make the space of constitutional courts and law
appealing to "secularist, modernist, cosmopolitan, and other
antireligious social forces." 5 These include: (1) co-optation of alternative
religious discourses from competing traditional authorities;6 (2)
jurisdictional advantages that inhere from bringing religious law within
the ambit of state law, which allows both the standardization and
enforcement of the former;7 (3) strategic delegation of potentially thorny
social issues by political elites to constitutional courts;8 (4) the very
epistemology of constitutional law9 that makes it "a more hospitable
domain for secularist worldviews and policy preferences than for
religious ideology";' 0 (5) constitutional challenges to religion-based
associations such as political parties;11 and finally (6) political control of
judicial appointments, which effectively means that political elites are
able to promote judges who have secularist leanings.12
4. Id. at 50.
5. Id. at 51.
6. Id. at 51-59.
7. Id. at 59-64.
8. Id. at 64-72.
9. Id. at 72-82.
10. Id. at 82.
11. Id. at 83-85.
12. Id. at 85-101.
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Next, Hirschl devotes two chapters to empirical cases to advance
and substantiate his arguments. Chapter 4 draws on experiences of
constitutional courts in seven countries (Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan,
Malaysia, Nigeria, Israel, and Turkey), and readers are taken on a
voyage in which they get a glimpse of concrete issues ranging from
Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court's treatment of appropriate attire
for women to the Supreme Court of Israel's handling of the foundational
"Who is a Jew?" question. In these and most of the other examples
presented, courts engage in dynamic and creative interpretations that
depict religious laws and norms as constituting a moderate and flexible
system of codes that coheres neatly with the democratic rights
enshrined in constitutions. In Chapter 5, Hirschl extends the narrative
to the secularist world through concrete legal cases from Europe, Latin
America, South Africa, and Canada. The book shows that, like their
counterparts in constitutional theocracies, constitutional courts in these
societies also grapple with legal issues that emanate from popular
support for religion and also serve as vehicles for curbing religious
excesses. In his conclusion, Hirschl suggests the value of a truly
comparative study of constitutional law and religion that yields
generalizations extending beyond the traditionally studied world of
North America and Europe, particularly in constitutional law.
Overall, Hirschl's book makes an impressive contribution to
scholarship on law and religion in general and to the burgeoning
literature on law in action in Muslim societies in particular. Because
constitutional theocracies are presently predominantly found in the
Muslim world, I will briefly consider the normative position of Hirschl's
argument, which is informed by a realist, "consociational" view of
constitutional design-as opposed to an ideational one-whereby the
constitution becomes the site for power sharing among different
interests, in the process encouraging moderation on all sides.13
According to Hirschl, when courts themselves take a pragmatist,
problem-solving oriented approach to constitutional law, they privilege
social conciliation over inflexible adherence to foundational principles. 14
I concur that in most cases discussed, constitutional courts have
indeed taken a middle ground on the religion question and have served
as important agents for mitigating contests over highly sensitive
cultural issues ranging from women's rights, citizenship, minority
rights, and so on. However, the privileging of religious law within
formal state structures in effect legitimates institutional and discursive
practices that may be amenable to gross violations of rights. Laying
13. See id. at 44.
14. See id. at 80-81.
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down legal frameworks that give greater space to religion is normatively
good and desirable both because it reflects genuine popular will and
because it tempers religious zeal for theocratic governance. However,
initial containment of such zeal may have the effect of subsequent
entrenchment of more moderate, but nonetheless illiberal, rights
discourses. Thus in countries like Pakistan, women's groups pushing for
reform of gender discriminatory laws continue to face intense opposition
from a male-dominated public while political leaders who publicly
critique draconian laws, such as the blasphemy laws passed by General
Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s, face threats to their very lives, as witnessed by
the recent assassination of Punjab governor Salman Taseer.
Second, the book underrecognizes the extent to which Islamist
political parties are invested in formal entry into, and control of, formal
state apparatuses. Taking the case of Pakistan again, since the
country's inception, Islamist political parties have been highly vocal
participants in national constitutional debates on the relationship
between the state and Islam, oftentimes presenting their own
constitutional designs. Thus, the very power of the state-an entity that
no doubt is founded on a modernist paradigm that is inherently inclined
toward secularism-makes it a material and symbolic resource over
which different groups vie to exert control. While modern states may be
inherently inclined toward secularism, the rational organization,
systematic ideological rhetoric, and democratic appeal of Islamist
groups make it a real possibility that state structures can accommodate
theocracy over constitutionalism. Examples of this can be found in
Sudan and Iran. Notwithstanding these points, Ran Hirschl has written
an ambitious and significant book that should interest legal scholars as
well as those working in political sociology, political science, and
religion.
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